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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Leroy Simpson appeals contending the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress the coerced-compliant statement1 he made to officers after they 
misused several interrogation tactics to overbear his will. He also asserts that the 
district court erred in several aspects of its analysis. First, it expressly did not consider 
two relevant factors (whether Mr. Simpson had been informed of his rights under 
Miranda2 and whether Mr. Simpson's mental health issues impacted the involuntariness 
of his statements). Second, the district court's conclusion that, in the totality of all the 
relevant circumstances, Mr. Simpson's will was not overborn, is disproved by the 
record. The video and transcript of the interrogation at issue both show how officers 
successfully overbore Mr. Simpson's will by improperly employing various interrogation 
tactics, and so, extracted a coerced-compliant statement from him. 
As such, Mr. Simpson's statements from that interrogation should have been 
suppressed as they were obtained in a violation of Mr. Simpson's constitutional rights. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's order denying the motion to 
suppress those statements and remand this case for further proceedings. 
1 Dr. Charles Honts, who gave expert testimony about the psychology of interrogations 
in this case, explained that the term "coerced-compliant confession" (or statement) is a 
term of art used in the literature when the officers overbear the will of the subject of an 
interrogation and extract a statement from the subject. (Tr., Vol.1, p.139, L.21 - p.140, 
L.15.) That term is preferable because it helps avoid confusion resulting from 
the different ways the more commonly-used term "false confession" might be 
understood - false as to the facts of the statement, as opposed to false in that the 
statement was involuntary. (Tr., Vol.1, p.139, L.21 -p.140, L.15.) 
The references in these citations, as well as other citations in this brief, to "Vol.1" 
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing held on 
April 16, 2014. "Vol.2" refers to the volume containing the transcripts of the change of 
plea hearing held on May 8, 2014, and the sentencing hearing held on October 2, 2014. 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436, 458 (1966). 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Simpson experienced a childhood While was able to function 
relatively well, he still required special ucation classes in order to graduate high 
school. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.11.) Dr. Kenneth 
Lindsey's initial evaluation of Mr. Simpson led him to believe, with ··some reasonable 
confidence," Mr. Simpson was suffering from executive dysfunction (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, 
Ls.4-20.) Dr. Lindsey had also diagnosed Mr. Simpson with bipolar disorder, attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and a mixed learning disability, and had made a rule out 
diagnosis for paraphilia. (2013 Psychosexual Examination (hereinafter, PSE), p.12.) 
He would subsequently perform a full evaluation, in which he diagnosed Mr. Simpson 
with frontal lobe and executive function deficits, dysphasia, bipolar disorder, mixed 
anxiety disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and mixed learning disability. 
(2014 PSE, pp.7-8, 18.)3 
As Dr. Lindsey explained, these conditions, particularly the executive 
dysfunction, make it difficult for Mr. Simpson to appreciate his decisions in their broader 
context; he "just doesn't process information very quickly, and the thought processes 
move slowly compared to the average person."4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.10-12 (Dr. Lindsey 
testifying about his conclusions regarding Mr. Simpson's mental health issues).) Thus, 
Dr. Lindsey attributed Mr. Simpson's "simplistic and almost illogical" statements during 
the interrogation to Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L.4 - p.90, 
L.14; cf 2014 PSE, pp.7-8 (describing it as the result of Mr. Simpson's "concrete 
thought processes and generalized Executive Dysfunction").) 
3 The 2014 evaluation incorporated most of the information from the 2013 PSE because 
Mr. Simpson's stance on the underlying offense was unchanged. (2014 PSE, p.2.) 
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In addition to these mental health issues, Mr. Simpson's family life was traumatic. 
PSI, p.9 (detailing that history, included physical abuse hands of his 
the loss of his sister at a young age, and a struggle with drug abuse).) Those 
issues ultimately resulted in Mr. Simpson being placed in foster care by Jessica Marley, 
the social worker assigned to Mr. Simpson's case. (See Exhibit 1b, p.18, Ls.14-17.)5 
Mr. Simpson ultimately moved in with a friend, his friend's wife, and their two 
sons (one grown, the other, a child). Thereafter, the child, M.G., was taken to the 
hospital and showed numerous injuries. Now-Officer Jessica Marley and Officer Brent 
Lawrence were the primary investigators on that case. They suspected that several 
people, including Mr. Simpson had been involved in causing M G.'s injuries, but they did 
not suspect that Mr. Simpson had caused all the injures. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.64, 
Ls.18-20 (Officer Marley testifying, "I certainly probably did say that it wasn't his fault 
Not all of it -- not all of it was his fault."); R., p.31 (Officer Marley's report indicating she 
told M.G.'s mother that, if Officer Marley were the lead officer, M.G.'s mother would be 
facing criminal charges in regard to this incident); see also Tr., Vol.2, p.37, Ls.3-7 (the 
prosecutor admitting "I don't think the defendant caused all of the victim's injuries. 
I mean, I don't want to stand here and say he's to blame for all of this because I don't 
think that's the case.").) 
4 The prosecutor offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the 
nature and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. (See generally R., Tr.) 
5 The transcript of the police interrogation of Mr. Simpson was admitted as Exhibit 1 b. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.12-13.) The corresponding video of that interrogation was admitted 
as Exhibit 1a. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, Ls.11-12.) Unfortunately, the audio on Exhibit 1a cuts in 
and out throughout the recording. (See generally Exhibit 1 a.) Thus, there are several 
points where statements are inaudible. (See generally Exhibit 1 b.) The time stamp on 
Exhibit 1 a shows the interview lasted from 11 :37:31 through 1 :35:57, and citations to 
that exhibit will include the relevant time stamp to the best of appellate counsel's ability. 
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Eventually, Officer Marley was asked to locate Mr. Simpson and bring him in for 
an interview, which she , Vol. 1, p.1 Ls.13-19.) He asked her if the interview 
to be right then, and she indicated that was preferable. , Vol.1, p.44, 
Ls.21-22.) She also told him he would not be arrested at that time. (Tr., Vol.1, p.45, 
Ls.20-23.) As such, he changed clothes and Officer Marley drove him to the police 
station. (Tr., Vol.1, p.45, Ls.2-5.) 
When Mr. Simpson entered the interview room, he sat down in one of the two 
chairs in the room. (Exhibit 1 a, approx. 11 :47:45.) Officers immediately directed him to 
sit in the other chair, which was against the wall opposite the door. (Exhibit 1 a, 
approx. 11 :47:45.) When the officers entered, they would take the chair by the door, 
and when both were in the room together, Officer Lawrence would stand either in front 
of the door or in the door jam. (See generally Exhibit 1a.) 
Officer Lawrence started the interrogation and reiterated that Mr. Simpson was 
not under arrest and would be free to leave. (Exhibit 1 b, p.3, Ls.3-5.) He did not 
provide Mr. Simpson with a Miranda warning though. (R., p.116; see generally Exhibit 
1 b.) After asking Mr. Simpson to clarify some facts, Officer Lawrence left and was 
replaced by Officer Marley. (Exhibit 1b, p.17, Ls.7-12.) Officer Marley confronted 
Mr. Simpson, asserting he was telling different versions of events. (Exhibit 1 b, p.17, 
Ls.12-16.) She proceeded to interrogate Mr. Simpson on numerous issues related to 
the investigation. (See generally 1b.) While most of the interrogation focused on 
alleged incidents of physical abuse, Officer Marley briefly questioned Mr. Simpson on 
injuries M.G. allegedly had to his anus, suggesting that M.G. had been sexually abused 
as well. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.6-8.) 
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As Officer Marley interrogated Mr. Simpson, she began to develop several 
example, she talked about forensic evidence they had gathered, and 
they now had "all the evidence we need" and so, he should just tell them what 
happened.6 (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.30, L.19 - p.31, L.20.) She also minimized 
Mr. Simpson's alleged actions, indicating they were understandable because he must 
have been exhausted or because of his own troubled childhood. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, 
p.20, Ls.7-9; Exhibit 1b, p.24, Ls.1-4; Exhibit 1b, p.35, Ls.2-8.) 
Specifically in regard to her discussions of Mr. Simpson's troubled childhood, 
Officer Marley reminded Mr. Simpson that she had been the social worker on the case, 
and so, told him she just wanted to help him.7 (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.18, Ls.12-18; 
Exhibit 1 b, p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.15; Exhibit 1 b, p.32, Ls. 8-17; Exhibit 1 b, p.37, Ls.15-18; 
Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.15-21; Exhibit 1b, p.40, L.16 - p.41, L.21.) Often, when she 
switched to that theme, her demeanor and tone would change. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 a. 
12:041:21-12:05:20; see generally Exhibit 1a.) 
For most of Officer Marley's initial interrogation, Mr. Simpson denied hurting M.G. 
(See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.24, Ls.23-24; Exhibit 1 b, p.32, Ls.20-21; Exhibit 1 b, p.36, 
Ls.21-25; Exhibit 1 b, p.38, L.8.) However, he also began to repeat back some of the 
themes Officer Marley was developing. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.33, L.25 (adopting the 
6 Both Officer Lawrence and Officer Marley admitted that they misrepresented the 
nature and amount of forensic evidence to Mr. Simpson. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.32, 
L.5 - p.33, L.7 (Officer Lawrence admitting he had not talked to the medical experts at 
the time of the interrogation); Tr., Vol.1, p.73, L.17 - p.74, L.7 (Officer Marley admitting 
she had not seen DNA results before bringing them up to Mr. Simpson).) In fact, they 
were still awaiting test results on some of that evidence. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.35, 
Ls.20-23.) 
7 The district court found, as a matter of fact, that there was no patient-counselor 
relationship between Mr. Simpson and Officer Marley, nor did she articulate the 
specifics of their previous relationship experiences. (R., p.117 .) 
5 
theme that he was stressed out); Exhibit 1 b, p.39, Ls.24-25 (adopting the theme that 
is a hard to talk about); Exhibit 1 p.42, 1 6 (adopting theme that the 
have other forensic evidence incriminating him).) Additionally, when he would 
offer a denial or an alternate explanation to Officer Marley's assertions, she would reject 
that as a lie. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.25, Ls.9-11; Exhibit 1b, p.31, Ls.19-20; Exhibit 1 b, 
p.36, Ls.4-15; Exhibit 1b, p.42, Ls.8-9.) At other times, Officer Marley would ask 
Mr. Simpson, "how long are you going to live with this before it's going to affect you?" 
(Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.17-18; see also Exhibit 1b, p.43, Ls.2-3.) When she was working 
this theme, she would usually take up a different posture than when she was talking 
about Mr. Simpson's childhood. (See generally Exhibit 1a.) For example, she would sit 
back in her chair, often with arms or legs crossed, and she would use a different, less 
friendly tone. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1a, 12:26:30-12:27:40; see generally Exhibit 1a.) 
Ultimately, Officer Lawrence rejoined the interrogation. Officer Marley had to 
shift aside so Officer Lawrence could enter the room. (Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:38:39.) 
Officer Lawrence told Mr. Simpson that "[n]obody is going to believe you," explaining he 
had talked with various physicians and experts who all had good reputations in the 
community, and they would testify that Mr. Simpson was guilty. (Exhibit 1 b, p.47, L.19; 
Exhibit 1 b, p.48, L. 19 - p.50, L.6.) He then asked Mr. Simpson: "So when you go to the 
jury and all these doctors get up there and say this is what happened, who do you think 
that the jury is going to be looking at?" at which point he bent over to peer into 
Mr. Simpson's face. (Exhibit 1b, p.50, Ls.4-7; Exhibit 1a, 12:47:35.) When Mr. Simpson 
responded, "[t]he person that did it," Officer Lawrence interrupted and said, "[t]hey're 
going to be looking right at you, Le[r]oy." (Exhibit 1b, p.50, Ls.10-12.) 
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Officer Lawrence showed his frustration that Mr. Simpson was maintaining his 
as his tone became more authoritative, and told Mr. Simpson his words 
were empty and untruthfuL (Exhibit 1 b, p 50, Ls.12-23; Exhibit 1 a, approx .. 12:46:30.) 
He finally gave Mr. Simpson an ultimatum· 
Which one do you want to be, the person that's being accused of this and 
doesn't care or the person who cares and says, you know, I'm sorry, I tried 
to take care of him .... This is your last chance, Le[r]oy. Do you want to 
be the comparing -- or compassionate person who actually cares about 
[M.G.] or this other person that people are like, I can't like that person. We 
all understand bad things happen, but he doesn't even care. He says he 
cares, but he doesn't because look at what we're here -- nothing to back it 
up. He doesn't say what really happened. 
(Exhibit 1 b, p.51, L 12 - p.52, L.9.) 
Despite that ultimatum, Mr. Simpson attempted to maintain his innocence, at 
which point, Officer Lawrence yelled at him, "You did do it I'm giving you the 
opportunity to explain it, Le[r]oy." (Exhibit 1 b, p.52, Ls.17-24; Exhibit 1 a, approx. 
12:51 :10; see also R., p.88.) Things remained at that heated level until Officer Marley 
intervened. (See Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:53:08; Exhibit 1b, p.52, L.24 - p.55, L.4.) She 
told Mr. Simpson she understood his emotions because she knew his past, and she just 
wanted to help him because "I'm a social worker wearing a police uniform." (Exhibit 1 b, 
p.57, Ls.5-6; see generally Exhibit 1 b, p.56, L.4 - p.58, L.21.) At that point, Mr. Simpson 
asked, "(Inaudible) cigarette first." (Exhibit 1 b, p.58, L.22.) Officer Marley told him that 
would be fine and accompanied him outside. (Exhibit 1 b. p.58, Ls.23-25.) She did not 
consider letting Mr. Simpson go unsupervised. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.16-18.) 
When they came back inside, Mr. Simpson made several incriminating 
statements to Officer Marley about hitting M.G. (See generally Exhibit 1 b, p.59, 
L.1 - p.63, L.11.) Officer Marley's demeanor, posture, and tone remained friendly during 
this portion of the interrogation. (See Exhibit 1 a, 1 :02:02 - 1 :08:25.) She then began 
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asking questions about the injuries to M G 's anus, and Mr. Simpson continued to deny 
causing those injuries. ( See Exhibit 1 b, 12 - p.65, L 10.) Officer Marley told 
Simpson not to regress, and he eventually admitted to penetrating M. with his 
finger. (Exhibit 1b, p.65, Ls.2-16; Exhibit 1b, p.66, Ls.23-25.) 
However, Officer Marley continued to interrogate Mr. Simpson, representing that 
there were injuries more extensive than would be caused by just a finger. (Exhibit 1 b, 
p.67, Ls.10-12.) When Mr. Simpson mentioned that those injuries could have been 
caused by a vibrator, Officer Marley asked if he specifically had used that to penetrate 
M.G., saying "It's okay, Le[r]oy, if you did." (Exhibit 1 b, p.67, Ls.19-22.) When 
Mr. Simpson refused to adopt that suggestion, Officer Marley told him. 'Tm not trying to 
say that you're bad. I just am trying to figure out the truth because you can't live with 
this bottled up anymore. I'm trying to figure out and make sure that there are no other 
children ... [b]ecause if that's the case, you need a different kind of help." (Exhibit 1 b, 
p. 70, L.24 - p. 71, L.6; Exhibit 1 a, 1: 19:37 - 1 :20:02.) Mr. Simpson responded that there 
were no other children and affirmed the suggestion that he had used the vibrator on 
M.G. (Exhibit 1b, p.71, Ls.17-20.) The officers finished up the interview and offered to 
drive Mr. Simpson home. (See generally Exhibits 1a, 1b.) 
Mr. Simpson was subsequently charged with sexual penetration and injury 
to a child. (R., pp.9-10; see Augmentation.)8 He filed a motion to suppress the 
statements made during the interrogation as involuntary and the product of coercion. 
(R., pp.84-90.) In his motion, he highlighted several tactics employed during the 
8 A motion to augment the record with the information filed against Mr. Simpson was 
filed contemporaneously with this brief. 
8 
interrogation that were part of the so-called "Reid technique," and which demonstrated 
impermissibly coercive atmosphere . (R., pp.84-90.) 
a hearing on his motion, Officers Lawrence and Marley testified about their 
approaches to the interrogation. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, pp.8-82.) Mr. Simpson also 
called Dr. Honts, a professor of psychology, to discuss the problems with the way the 
officers employed their interrogation tactics against Mr. Simpson. (See generally 
Tr., Vol.1, pp.93-142.) For example, Dr. Honts explained that Officer Marley's reliance 
on her prior relationship with Mr. Simpson "seems very coercive psychologically, and I 
was actually very surprised to see that someone would do that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.111, 
L.11 p.112, L.6.) He also explained that every admission Mr. Simpson made was 
initially suggested by one of the officers, including the use of the vibrator. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.112, L.24 - p.113, L.4.) Dr. Lindsey, who had performed a psychosexual evaluation 
on Mr. Simpson, also testified that Mr. Simpson's reference to the vibrator in the first 
place was illogical and demonstrative of an irregular thought process during the 
interrogation, which was consistent with Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.) 
The district court ultimately denied Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress. 
(R., pp.111-18.) In so doing, it determined the fact that Mr. Simpson had not been read 
his Miranda rights to be irrelevant because this was not a custodial interrogation; 
Mr. Simpson was there voluntarily and free to leave. (R., p.116.) The district court also 
accepted the officer's testimony that Mr. Simpson appeared to be tracking their 
questions during the interrogation, and so determined that Mr. Simpson's mental health 
issues did not factor in to the involuntariness of his statements. (R., p.117.) It 
noted that all interrogation techniques are designed to be coercive, but determined that, 
9 
the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Simpson's statements were voluntary. 
11 
Simpson subsequently entered an Alforcf! plea pursuant a plea agreement 
(R., pp.122-25.) As part of that plea, Mr. Simpson reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's order denying his motion to suppress. (R., p.122.) The district court 
ultimately imposed a unified sentence of thirty-three years, with eight years fixed, on the 
then-thirty-one-year-old Mr. Simpson (R., pp.140-41; PSI, p.1.) Mr. Simpson filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.149-50.) 
9 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
10 
ISSUE 
district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to suppress the 
statement officers extracted from after overbearing his will 
11 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Simpson's Motion To Suppress The Coerced-
Compliant Statement The Officers Extracted From Him After Overbearing His Will 
A. Standard Of Review 
The standard for review for motions to suppress is bifurcated. See, e.g., 
State v. Aitken, 121 Idaho 783, 784 (Ct App. 1992). The factual findings of the district 
court will not be disturbed absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
However, the application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo. Id. In cases 
where the defendant claims his statements to officers were not made voluntarily, the 
burden of proof is on the State - the State must show, by a totality of the circumstances, 
the statement was made voluntarily. Id. 
B. The Totality Of The Circumstances Shows That The Officers' Interrogation 
Tactics Overbore Mr. Simpson's Will And Resulted In An Coerced-Compliant 
Statement In Violation Of Mr. Simpson's Constitutional Rights 
One of the constitutional rights citizens of the United States and of the State of 
Idaho enjoy is the right to not be compelled to be a witness against themselves. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. Thus, when the defendant 
makes statements as the product of either express or implicit police coercion, those 
statements cannot be used as evidence against the defendant. See, e.g., 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218. 228 (1973); State v. Kysar, 114 Idaho 457, 
459 (Ct. App. 1988). As the United States Supreme Court has explained: "For, no 
matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no more 
than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is 
directed." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228 (defining the test for voluntariness in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment); Kysar, 114 Idaho at 458 (evaluating the same 
12 
uestion under the auspices of the and Fourteenth Amendments). Furthermore, 
may that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but 
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in this way, namely, by 
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."' Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 228-29 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (overruled 
on other grounds, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967))). Thus, "'[i]t is the duty 
of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon."' Id. (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635). 
The arena of noncustodial police interrogations is one such area where coercion 
may be in a less repulsive form, but is nonetheless unconstitutional. After all, there is 
no evidence that Mr. Simpson was physically abused in order to extract his statement. 
(See generally Exhibit 1a) However, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, 
'"coercion can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not 
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448 (quoting 
Blackbum v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960)). The Supreme Court explained that, 
precisely because the techniques used in the custodial interrogation are inherently 
coercive, the courts must be watchful for improper use of those techniques so as to 
guard against the unconstitutional extraction of statements from subjects of 
interrogation Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 247 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458). 
The Supreme Court's concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations 
are equally applicable in the noncustodial interview - the tactics being used by the 
officers are designed to convince a person to make a statement when he is not 
otherwise inclined to do so. ( See, e.g. R, pp.116-17 (the district court explaining that 
all police interviews involve some level of coercion; Tr., Vol.1, p.140, L.5 - p.141, L.3 
13 
(Dr. Honts describing such a statement as a coerced-compliant statement).) Therefore, 
courts should evaluate the tactics used by officers in 
noncustodial setting with the same care as the tactics used in the custodial setting so as 
to ensure the officers do not impermissibly overbear the subject's will to extract a 
statement in violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 
211, 214 (1993) ("the proper inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances and 
then ask whether the defendant's will was overborn.") 
One of the common interrogation techniques used by officers is the so-called 
"Reid technique," which Dr. Honts described at length in his testimony. 10 ( See 
Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, LS - p.101, L 15.) The Reid technique is a multistep process which 
involves the officers seeking to get statements from the defendant by a variety of 
tactics. First, the interrogators put the subject on the defensive and seek to stress 
him out (Tr., Vol. 1, p.99, Ls.14-16.) This happens, in part, by isolating the subject 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.101, Ls.2-4.) The interrogators also maintain control of the room, often by 
placing themselves between the subject and the door. (Tr., Vol.1, p.101, Ls.4-8.) 
Then, the officers start developing themes which minimize the alleged conduct or 
maximize the seriousness of noncooperation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.99 p.100, L.5.) In 
developing these themes, officers may use a variety of approaches, such as minimizing 
the alleged conduct, making representations about the nature of other evidence in the 
case (whether true or fabricated) (see Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.27-24), or using a "false 
friend" persona (see State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1016-17 (Utah 1999) 
(discussing the use of the false friend tactic)). Important to this whole process, 
10 Although not discussing them as part of a single technique, the United States 
Supreme Court has evaluated the use of the same sort of tactics which make up the 
Reid technique at some length in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55. 
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however, is that the interrogators start from the standpoint that the defendant is 
guilty, and (b) lying, and so, the interrogators will not allow the subject to deny their 
accusations. (See Tr., p.100, L.25 - p 101, L.2 ("The person is not allowed to deny. 
Everything they deny or attempt to come up with an alternative hypothesis, they' re 
interrupted ") 
The use of any of these tactics is not per se problematic; rather, one or several of 
these tactics may be misapplied in a given interrogation, and, as such, will produce an 
unconstitutional coerced-compliant statement. See, e.g. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55; 
Kysar, 114 Idaho at 457; see also Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1017 (specifically 
evaluating the use of the Reid technique); In re Elias V., 237 Cal.App.4th 568 
(Cal.Ct.App. 2015) (same). This is important because, when these interrogation 
techniques are misapplied, it causes significant problems. As Dr. Honts testified, in 
approximately 25% of the cases where the Innocence Project has shown actual 
innocence, there has been a factually-untrue confession by the defendant. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.101, Ls.20-23.) Furthermore, in nearly all the interrogations leading to those coerced-
compliant confessions, the interrogators misused the false-evidence tactic. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.101, Ls.20-23.) Similarly, Dr. Honts testified that laboratory studies have revealed 
that, when the interrogator uses (much less misuses) the minimization tactic, "they 
increased the risk of false confession by a factor of three." (Tr., Vol.1, p.106, Ls.5-12.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has explored the reason behind an innocent person's 
decision to make a factually-untrue confession in light of interrogators misusing these 
tactics. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015-17. For example, the Utah Court noted that, 
when interrogators lie to the subject of the interrogation about the evidence they have, 
"it may lead to wrongly accused suspects 'to see themselves as either being set up or 
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railroaded."' Id. at 1015 (quoting Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A Leo, The Decision to 
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 7 4 Denv. U Rev. 979, 1044 
(1 "Such suspects may well determine that 'continued resistance is futile 
(because the police have evidence that will convict him despite his innocence) "' 
Id. (quoting Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 2001, 2053 (1998)). Thus, "[s]uch a suspect may also conclude that, given the 
futility of resistance, it is most prudent to cooperate and even confess falsely in order to 
get leniency." Id. This tactic is particularly coercive and troubling when the 
interrogators lie about whether they have scientific evidence (such as DNA, fingerprints, 
or ballistic evidence) because '"[b]oth the guilty and the innocent have a harder time 
explaining away evidence that is allegedly derived from scientific technologies."' Id. 
(quoting Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, at 1023). The Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that similar problems arise, and thus, coerced-compliant statements 
are extracted, when interrogators misapply other aspects of the Reid technique, such as 
the false friend tactic or the minimization tactic. See id. at 1017-18. 
Thus, in order to determine whether the interrogators are misusing a particular 
tactic or technique, it is important to look at the tactic in the context of the interrogation 
as a whole (i.e., evaluate it in the totality of the circumstances). For example, in Kysar, 
the defendant had been arrested and asked voluntarily to speak with the lead 
investigator. Kysar, 114 Idaho at 457. During the ensuing 30-minute interview, the 
defendant was emotional, the officer said he would talk to the prosecutor about the 
defendant's cooperation, and the officer told the defendant that he expected the 
defendant would be released in time to be present for his child's birth. Id. at 457-58. 
The Court of Appeals found that the defendant's ensuing statements about the offense 
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were not voluntary because the officer's statements amounted to promises he did not 
the authority to fulfill, and so, the officer's statements were unconstitutionally 
Id. at 458-59. 
By contrast, in State v. Loosli, the officer made various statements during a 
voluntary interview with the defendant to the effect that God would not forgive the 
defendant if he was not honest, and that the officer would tell the defendant's daughters 
that the defendant was calling them liars, which might cause them to consider 
committing suicide. State v. Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 400 (1997). Despite the extreme 
nature of the officer's comments, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the defendant's 
subsequent statements were still voluntary: "although no Miranda Warnings [sic] were 
given, Loosli came voluntarily to the police station; the questioning by the officers was of 
a 'relatively short length'[11 ]; Loosli was a mature adult, whose education level is not 
disclosed by the record; the questioning was of a persistent nature but of a short 
duration," the totality of the circumstances did not indicate the defendant's will had been 
overborn. Id. 
This case is more like Kysar than Loosli. For example, unlike the defendant in 
Loosli, Mr. Simpson has mental health issues which impact his ability to process 
information and appreciate it in its broader context. (Tr., Vol.1, p.85, L.9 - p.92, L.17 
(Dr. Lindsey testifying about his professional impressions of Mr. Simpson's cognitive 
abilities); 2013 PSE (detailing Dr. Lindsey's opinions about Mr. Simpson's cognitive 
abilities); PSI, p.11 (noting that, while Mr. Simpson was able to graduate high school, he 
required special education courses to reach that goal).) For example, Dr. Lindsey 
11 The exact length of the interview is not identified in the Loosli opinion. See generally 
Loosli, 130 Idaho 398. 
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explained that Mr. Simpson struggled to fully appreciate the nature of his statements 
the alleged conduct in this case: "he has some difficulty with social 
comprehension and social judgment And that was based on -- on his -- his reversal of 
course in the interview with police." (Tr., VoL 1, p.89, Ls.7-10.) These struggles were 
the likely related to his executive dysfunction and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. 
(2013 PSE, p.5.) 
Thus, unlike the defendant in Loosli, Mr. Simpson was not "the mature adult of 
unknown education leveL" He is an adult who, though capable, struggles to understand 
the nature of the interrogation and his statements made therein. That means he was 
more likely to be coerced and to have his will overborn by the officers' interrogation 
techniques than the defendant in Loosli. Compare Kysar, 114 Idaho 457-59. 
However, the district court did not consider Mr. Simpson's mental health issues in 
its analysis of this issue because it believed the officers' testimony that Mr. Simpson 
appeared to be tracking their questions during the interview. (R., p.116.) That decision 
was erroneous because it misconstrued Dr. Lindsey's testimony and his evaluation, and 
thus, the nature of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. See Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 
Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (reiterating that, when the district court reaches a factual 
conclusion that is not supported by substantial and competent evidence, that conclusion 
should be set aside as clearly erroneous). 
Dr. Lindsey testified that Mr. Simpson is capable of offering a plausible response 
to a question, but that he will still experience "some difficulty with social comprehension 
and social judgment." (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.7-8.) In fact, Dr. Lindsey testified that 
Mr. Simpson's struggles were actually evident during the interrogation. (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, 
Ls.8-10.) For example, in regard to Mr. Simpson mentioning the vibrator: 
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He justified why he told the story that he did in the end with, you know, 
"well, she had" -- "she had a vibrator, and so that made me think, well, I'll 
just use that as a story." And there's not -- there isn't the kind of 
sophisticated thinking-through of things that I would expect most people to 
have .... it's just the -- the simplistic and almost illogical use of some of 
the reasons that he reversed course. And the reversal of course was, you 
know, blatant 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.11-24.) Dr. Lindsey concluded this was the result of the fact that 
Mr. Simpson "just doesn't process information very quickly, and the thought processes 
move slowly compared to the average person."12 (Tr., Vol.1, p.90, Ls.10-12.) Thus, the 
district court's conclusion - because Mr. Simpson appeared to be tracking the 
questions, there were no mental health issues at play in the interrogation (R., p.116) - is 
a nonsequitur at best. Mr. Simpson was displaying mental health issues in his 
comprehension of, and responses to, the officers' questions regardless of whether he 
was "tracking" the questions. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.89, L11 - p.90, L.12 (Dr. Lindsey 
explaining Mr. Simpson's mental health issues).) Thus, his mental health issues were a 
factor in the interrogation, and so, needed to be considered in the totality of the 
circumstances even if his struggles were not immediately apparent to the officers. 
See State v. Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 430 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157, 165, 167 (1986)) (reaffirming that a person's "'mental condition is surely 
relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercions,"' and thus, is a factor that 
needs to be considered in the totality of the circumstances). Therefore, the district 
court's refusal to consider that factor in the totality of the circumstances was erroneous. 
As such, that decision should at least be vacated. 
12 The prosecutor offered no evidence to contradict Dr. Lindsey's testimony about the 
nature and presentation of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues. (See generally R., Tr.) 
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Similarly, the district court refused 
informed of his right remain silent 
consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was 
his right to have an attorney present as 
discussed in Miranda based on its conclusion that Miranda was irrelevant in this case as 
it was not a custodial interrogation. (R., p.116.) As with its failure to consider 
Mr. Simpson's mental health issues, that determination constitutes an improper 
perspective on the relevance of that factor. In fact, that conclusion is directly contrary to 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191 
(2000). In Radford, the Idaho Supreme Court explained "we first note it is undisputed 
that Radford was not in custody at the time the statements were made. Even if the 
interview were non-custodial, Radford's statements are still inadmissible if the 
statements were not voluntary." Id. It subsequently noted that one of the relevant 
factors to the question of whether the statements were voluntary was "[w]hether 
Miranda warnings were given." Id. Thus, the Court considered the fact that the 
defendant had been given Miranda warnings during his voluntary interview as a factor 
which tended to show that his statements were voluntary (though that factor was 
ultimately outweighed by the other factors in that case). Id. 
Similarly, in Loosli, the Court considered the fact that "although no Miranda 
Warnings [sic] were given, Loosli came voluntarily to the police station," as a factor 
tending to show his statements were involuntary (though, as in Radford, that conclusion 
was outweighed in the totality of all the relevant factors). Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400. The 
district court's determination to the contrary - that the fact Mr. Simpson was not given a 
Miranda warning is irrelevant (R., p.116) - is, thus, clearly error. As such, that decision 
should at least be vacated. 
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With two of the relevant factors - Mr. Simpson's mental health issues and the 
Miranda warnings - already indicating that the interview in this case was more 
than others, and the record already indicating that Mr. Simpson was more 
susceptible to coercion, the officers began applying several of the tactics in the Reid 
interrogation technique to try and get Mr. Simpson to make a statement. 13 (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.106, Ls.17-21 (Dr. Honts testifying that the officers were employing tactics 
that are part of the Reid technique).) 
For example, the officers were expressly operating on the premise that 
Mr. Simpson was guilty: 
LEROY SIMPSON. You guys are already saying I did it. 
BRENT LAWRENCE: You did do it 
(Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:51·10; Exhibit 1b, p.52, Ls.21-23.) As a result, they did not 
accept any of Mr. Simpson's denials or explanations, often retorting, as demonstrated 
above, with angry assertions that he was lying. (See generally Exhibits 1a and 1b.) 
The officers' statements during the interrogation also show they were engaged in 
theme-building. (See generally Exhibit 1 b.) In fact, as Dr. Honts pointed out, every 
incriminating statement Mr. Simpson ultimately made was a repetition or endorsement 
13 It is true that Officer Lawrence testified he had not been specifically trained in the 
Reid technique. (Tr., Vol.1, p.19, L.9 - p.20, L.3 (Officer Lawrence testifying that he has 
not had any recent formal training in interrogation techniques, just that the subject had 
been touched on as part of other classes which he had taken)). However, even if they 
were not trained in that particular technique, the use of the tactics which compromise 
that technique still introduced the same risk of evoking a coerced-compliant statement 
from Mr. Simpson, and thus, should still be reviewed for proper and constitutional 
application. Compare Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450-55 (evaluating the use of these tactics 
in regard to a potentially unconstitutional interrogation without indicating whether the 
officers in that case had been formally trained in a particular interrogation technique). In 
fact, if the officers were not trained in the proper use of these tactics, it is actually more 
likely that they would misuse the tactics and violate Mr. Simpson's constitutional rights 
during the interrogation. 
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of one of the themes the officers had already suggested him. (Tr., Vol.1, p.112, L.23 
113, see generally Exhibit 1 b ) One of the biggest themes the officers, 
particularly Officer Marley, developed Mr. Simpson was referencing his traumatic 
childhood and suggesting that those experiences influenced his behavior with M.G 
(See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.23, L.23 - p.24, L.6; Exhibit 1b, p.40, Ls.16-20; see also 
Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.19 - p.71, L.6 (Officer Marley acknowledging that a lot of her 
questions dealt with this particular theme).) The effect of that theme was particularly 
pronounced in this case because Officer Marley had been a social worker assigned to 
work on the case resulting from those traumatic experiences, and so, had first-hand 
knowledge of the facts. ( See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.18, Ls.13-17 (Officer Marley discussing 
some details of their previous encounters, including the fact that she had placed 
Mr. Simpson in foster care).)14 As Dr. Honts testified, this tactic "seems very coercive 
psychologically, and I was actually very surprised that someone would do that." 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.111, L.11 -p.112, L.6.) 
Dr. Honts' concerns are particularly related to the issues surrounding the "false 
friend" tactic Officer Marley was employing. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.57, L.24 - p.58, L.1 
("I come to you feeling empathy and sadness for you and hoping that I can help you, 
hoping I can help you somehow."); Exhibit 1 b, p.57, Ls.5-6 ('Tm a social worker wearing 
a police uniform.").) What she was telling Mr. Simpson was essentially, "I was able to 
help you before, so I'll be able to help you again." Her demeanor, posture, and 
tone are significantly different when she went to this theme. (See e.g., Exhibit 1a, 
14 The fact that Officer Marley was correcting Mr. Simpson as to some of the specifics of 
that prior encounter (see Exhibit 1 b, p.18, L.12 - p.19, L.2) also demonstrates that the 
district court's factual conclusion that Officer Marley did not reply on the specifics of 
their prior relationship (R., p.117) is clearly erroneous. 
22 
1 04:21 - 12:05:20; generally Exhibit 1a.) In the totality of the circumstances, such as 
Simpson's mental health issues, this which by itself was already bordering on 
edge of propriety (Tr., Vol.1, p.111. L.11 - p.12, L.6), was impermissibly coercive 
and contributed to Mr. Simpson making a coerced-compliant statement. As the Utah 
Supreme Court explained· "The false friend stratagem provides an environment in 
which other interrogation tactics may become coercive." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 
1017. In fact, it "may be ideally suited to extract an involuntary confession from certain 
types of suspects who, like Rettenberger [and Mr. Simpson] have below-average 
cognitive abilities," and other mental health issues. Id. at 1016. Those sort of persons 
in particular, who are presented with a false friend: 
[are] less likely to question the false claims about the evidence against 
him; [are] less likely to clearly invoke his right to counsel or to remain 
silent; [are] more likely to 'parrot' back the details the officers suggested, 
whether or not they were true; [are] more likely to place stock in any 
promises or threats the officers made, however ambiguous they might be; 
and [are] more likely to confess, whether guilty or innocent. 
Id. at 1017. Thus, the particularly egregious use of the false friend tactic against 
Mr. Simpson, particularly given his mental health issues, demonstrates that his 
statements were coerced-compliant statements extracted in violation of his 
constitutional rights. 
As the Rettenberger Court noted, one of the tactics more likely to be problematic 
in light of the false friend tactic is the false claims about other evidence indicating the 
subject's guilt. Id. Officer Marley, while using the false friend tactic, also employed the 
false evidence tactic, implying that officers had evidence, including scientific evidence, 
which proved Mr. Simpson's guilt. 15 (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.31, Ls.3-18; but see 
15 As Dr. Honts testified, interrogators tend to imply connections and consequences 
rather than articulating them outright. (Tr., Vol.1, p.100, Ls.6-16.) Thus, by telling 
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, Vol.1, p.73, L.17 - p.74, L.7 (admitting those implications were false); Tr., Vol.1, 
(admitting officers were waiting for results from the tests on 
evidence).) Officer Lawrence also used the false evidence tactic, asserting 
that they had a series of experts with solid reputations who would testify that 
Mr. Simpson was guilty. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.49, L.24 - p.50, L.7.) However, that 
too, was a lie. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.32, L.5 - p.33, L.7.) 
The coercive effect of these misrepresentations of the evidence is demonstrated 
by Mr. Simpson's responses thereto. He did not give explanations for that supposed 
evidence, but simply said, "I don't see why everyone is trying to say I did it though," 
(Exhibit 1b, p.35, Ls.16-17), or "You're saying it points back to me. (Inaudible) I didn't 
touch that kid, that kid at all, so--." (Exhibit 1 b, p.42, Ls.18-20). As the Utah Supreme 
Court has explained, such responses are characteristic of a coerced-compliant 
statement because it shows that the subject of the interrogation is feeling railroaded, 
that he has no explanation for the supposed scientific evidence, and so, has concluded 
continuing to profess their innocence is futile. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015-17. 
The other major theme the officers used was a theme of minimization, which 
included several subthemes. For example, they expressed to Mr. Simpson, who 
already struggles to see information in its proper broader context, that his alleged 
actions were understandable because he was just stressed out or frustrated. (See, e.g., 
Exhibit 1b, p.24, Ls.7-13.) They also worked the idea that it is hard to talk about the 
Mr. Simpson they had the ability to gather semen, DNA, and other bodily fluids, and 
following that with the assertion that they had collected all of the evidence they needed, 
Officer Marley implied that they had collected that sort of scientific evidence. 
(See Exhibit 1 b, p.31, Ls.4-18.) 
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alleged actions because they were not consistent with Mr. Simpson's overall personality 
character. ( See e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.32, Ls.1 
They contrasted that theme of minimization by telling him his denials and 
explanations were lies, and that he was telling conflicting stories. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, 
p.25, Ls.7-12; Exhibit 1b, p.29, Ls.14-15.) They reinforced that theme by asking him, 
"how do you live with yourself[?]" (See, e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.38, Ls.17-18; p.39, Ls.11-13; 
p.43, Ls.2-3.) While appeals to moral sensibility may generally be a permissible tactic 
(see, e.g., Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400), it, like all the other interrogation tactics, can be 
misused. See Rettenberger, 948 P.2d at 1017. The development of the minimization 
theme in this case is an example of such a misapplication of the interrogation tactics, 
particularly given the way Officer Lawrence used that tactic. 
Officer Lawrence developed two particular subthemes within the overall themes 
of minimizing and maximizing when he took over the interrogation. First, he worked on 
the idea that "part of being sorry is saying it was an accident." (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, 
p.46, L 10.) Second, he harped on the point that "[n]obody is going to believe you." 
(See} e.g., Exhibit 1b, p.47, L.19; see, e.g .. Exhibit 1a, 12.38:40-12:45:45 (depicting the 
shifts in tone and demeanor as Officer Lawrence developed these two themes).) He 
also worked in all the other established themes to bring the interrogation to its apex: 
So when mistakes happen, we need to acknowledge it and then say to the 
person a bad thing happened, I'm sorry, it will never happen again. And 
then when you that, it actually means something as opposed to, no, I don't 
want to own that because I don't like what happened. Well not owning it 
doesn't mean it didn't happen. Not owning it means that you're just not 
the person that everybody wants you to be, that you should be, that I think 
you are, as a caring person. Because everybody is going to look at this 
and go, you know man, that's really horrible, what happened to this kid. I 
can't believe he's not even man enough to say I'm sorry. 
(Exhibit 1 b, p.48, Ls.5-18.) 
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It is at this point where the coercion though evident throughout the interrogation, 
is clearly visible, as Officer Lawrence gave Mr. Simpson an ultimatum. 
So what I'm saying to you, Le[r]oy, which person are you, this person over 
here that nobody can respect that goes, okay, a bad thing happened, but I 
don't like it, so it didn't happen, or this person over here that says, yeah, 
I'm sorry, I was under a lot of stress. You know, life gets away from me. It 
was a mistake. You know, I'm really, really, really sorry and I'll do my best 
to make sure that it's as good as it can be. I'll help. So at the end of the 
day, which is right now, Le[r]oy, which one are you? 
(Exhibit 1 b, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.9.) There is only one answer to that question unless 
Mr. Simpson wanted to admit to being an uncaring, unrespected person. Additionally, 
Officer Marley just spent a lot of her time building up the idea that Mr. Simpson is a 
good person whose alleged bad act was justifiable, merely a product of his traumatic 
childhood, and not indicative of who he actually is. (See generally Exhibit 1b, pp.17-43.) 
Then, when Mr. Simpson gave the answer Officer Marley had primed him to give, 
which was really the only answer he could give, Officer Lawrence told him "you're 
words are empty unless you take responsibility." (Exhibit 1 b, p.49, Ls.12-13 
(emphasis added). Officer Lawrence's tone was particularly authoritative, practically 
yelling, as he repeated his demand for Mr. Simpson to give that answer. (See, e.g., 
Exhibit 1a, approx. 12:51:10 (when Mr. Simpson repeats that he did not do anything 
wrong, Officer Lawrence forcefully asserts, "You did do it. I'm giving you the opportunity 
to explain it," while pointing his finger at Mr. Simpson); Exhibit 1 b, 52, 23-24 (transcript 
of that exchange).) With the ultimatum and demand to prove it, Officer Lawrence put 
Mr. Simpson in a worse situation than the one identified by the Utah Supreme Court 
found in Rettenberger, where the factors surrounding that less coercive situation 
"compel[] a determination that Rettenberger's confession was involuntary to the extent 
that the record indicates that his will, already vulnerable due to certain known mental 
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disabilities and deficiencies, was overborne by the suggestive and coercive techniques 
the investigators, which exploited those very vulnerabilities." Rettenberger, 984 
at 1021. 
Officer Lawrence was demanding Mr. Simpson admit the alleged conduct, or 
else, forfeit the right to care about M.G. and the right to expect understanding from (and 
so, potentially, reacceptance by) the community. That told Mr. Simpson, with his 
concrete and under-appreciative thought processes, that resistance and continued 
expressions of his innocence would be futile, and he might as well tell the officers what 
they wanted to hear, under the hope that he might get some leniency. See id.; see also 
Kysar, 114 Idaho 457-459 (explaining how, while an interrogator's statements might 
seem benign, they could still be presented in such a way as to overbear the subject's 
will and unconstitutionally produce a statement by the defendant, even in a thirty-minute 
interview that the defendant himself requested). It is unsurprising, then, that once 
Officer Lawrence gave Mr. Simpson this ultimatum and forcefully demanded he prove 
his answer (see generally Exhibit 1a, approximately 12:51:10-12:55:00; Exhibit 1b, 
pp.48-53), Mr. Simpson started making the incriminating statements (See generally 
Exhibit 1 b, pp.53-58 (indicating he was sorry for the actions for which he had been 
accused and explaining that he had been in the midst of a severe depressive episode at 
the time)). 
The only deviation from the officers' apparently-intended progression of the 
interrogation (that they would break Mr. Simpson and he would start telling them 
everything they wanted him to) was the fact that Mr. Simpson asked to be able to take a 
smoke break. (Exhibit 1 b, p.58, Ls.22-24.) While allowing the subject to take breaks 
may, in a vacuum, be a factor which indicates a less-coercive atmosphere, it is the 
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context of the factor that makes all the difference under the Constitution. See, e.g., 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27; Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015; compare Kysar, 114 
Idaho at 458-59 (involving less extreme statements unconstitutionally overbearing the 
subject's will); with Loosli, 130 Idaho at 400 (more extreme statements which did not 
overbear the subject's will). The context in this case demonstrates the fact that the 
officers allowed Mr. Simpson to take a smoke break did not make his subsequent 
statements voluntary because they had already broken his will with Officer Lawrence's 
ultimatum and demand to prove it; he simply asked to have a "cigarette first," before 
making statements. (Exhibit 1 b, p.58, L.22 ) 
Furthermore, there are specific facts about the smoke break itself which indicate 
it was not as noncoercive as it might first appear. For example, Mr. Simpson was 
chaperoned by Officer Marley throughout the smoke break; she "didn't consider" letting 
Mr. Simpson go alone. (Tr., Vol.1, p.70 Ls.16-18.) As the United States Supreme 
Court pointed out in Miranda, that is inherently coercive, as the officers are trained that 
'"[t]he subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. . In his office, the 
investigator possesses all the advantages."' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-50 (quoting 
Charles E. O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation, p.99 (1956)). Allowing 
Mr. Simpson to designate a break would give him a psychological advantage of 
appearing to have some control over the interrogation. Thus, Officer Marley countered 
that advantage by chaperoning him during the smoke break. By so doing, she 
maintained the atmosphere of the officers' complete control, which makes the situation 
more coercive. See id. 
This desire to maintain total control over the interrogation is particularly evident 
given Officer Marley's testimony that, when Officer Lawrence got frustrated and yelled 
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Mr. Simpson, and Mr. Simpson stood up, she also stood up, so as to retain control 
over the room. ( See , Vol. 1, p.46, L.17 - p.4 7, However, the officers had never 
really lost control of the room. From the outset, they dictated where Mr. Simpson could 
sit, telling him to move from the chair next to the door to the chair across the room from 
the door. (Exhibit 1a, approx .. 11 :47:45.) Thus, when the officers subsequently entered 
the room and sat in the chair by the door, they controlled the room. (See generally 
Exhibit 1 a.) In fact, Officer Marley had to shift so that Officer Lawrence could get into 
the room. (Exhibit 1a, approximately 12:38:40.) And when both officers were in the 
room, Officer Lawrence was either standing in front of the door or in the door jam. 
(See generally Exhibit 1a.) As such, the officers were always in control of the room, and 
Mr. Simpson could not have left the room without their allowing him to do so. As a 
result, Mr. Simpson was isolated in that room until the officers decided to let him go, 
regardless of what representations they made that he would be free to leave of his own 
volition. 
Additionally, the record reveals that Officer Marley continued to talk with 
Mr. Simpson about subjects associated with the interrogation during the smoke break. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.6.) For example, Officer Marley testified that, during the 
smoke break, Mr. Simpson asked if he would be going to jail that day, and she 
responded that he would not. (Tr., Vol 1, p.48, L.25 - p.49, L.6.) The assertion 
that Mr. Simpson would not be arrested that day also shows coercion in the context of 
the interrogation because it indicated to Mr. Simpson that he could make the 
statements they wanted with some level of impunity. That was particularly coercive in 
Mr. Simpson's case, when his executive dysfunction, which limits his ability to put 
information into its broader context, is factored in The coercive effect of that statement 
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is also particularly obvious in this case, since Mr. Simpson had not been given a 
Miranda warning, which would tell would repercussions making a 
statement (i.e. that anything he said can and would be used against him in a court of 
law). 
It is also problematic that the smoke break was not recorded. In fact, it is 
particularly problematic in this case, as Officer Marley had already assured 
Mr. Simpson, as part of her earlier comments, that ''[w]henever I talk to somebody, I 
record what we say." (Exhibit 1 b, p.23, Ls.9-10.) Thus, Mr. Simpson would reasonably 
have been under the impression that the smoke break would also be recorded, since 
Officer Marley was talking with him, and whenever that happens, she "record[s] what we 
say. The United States Supreme Court has indicated it is important to have recordings 
of such interactions to avoid "a gap in our knowledge" in assessing whether the officers 
unconstitutionally extracted a statement from a person. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. In 
those cases, according to the United States Supreme Court, the courts can only look at 
what the officers are taught to do in such situations as an indication of what was likely 
happening during the unrecorded parts of the interrogation. Id. at 448-50 (reviewing 
texts discussing interrogation techniques and the coercive approaches officers are 
taught). Since, as noted above, officers are taught to maintain every psychological 
advantage, the known factors suggest that Officer Marley continued to keep that 
pressure on Mr. Simpson, implicitly or explicitly, as she chaperoned his smoke break. 
In fact, the record actually suggests that Officer Marley did precisely that, and 
kept the pressure (impliedly or expressly) on Mr. Simpson during the smoke break. As 
Officer Marley testified, Mr. Simpson's demeanor changed when they came back in 
from the smoke break. (Tr., Vol.1, p.49, Ls.7-16; see Exhibit 1a, 12:58:15-1:00:02.) 
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Dr. Honts also made specific note of this "sudden change" in Mr. Simpson's demeanor, 
describing it as "interesting. (Tr., Vol:1, 115, Ls.18-24.) Dr. Lindsey also noted the 
unusual nature of the change in Mr. Simpson's behavior, describing it as "blatant," and 
his ensuing statements as "simplistic and almost illogical." (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls.21-24.) 
This all indicates that Mr. Simpson's will was broken at least by the time he and Officer 
Marley came back in from the smoke break; that he had decided by that point that 
resisting was pointless and that cooperating (whether his subsequent statements were 
factually true or not) was his only choice. Compare Rettenberger, 984 P .2d at 1015. 
Thus, in the context of the whole interrogation. Officer Marley's decision to 
chaperone Mr. Simpson's smoke break was only reinforcing the coercive nature of the 
situation As such, the fact that a smoke break occurred does not mean the statements 
Mr. Simpson subsequently gave were not coerced-compliant statements. 
Finally, the nature of Mr. Simpson's admissions demonstrate that he was making 
coerced-compliant statements. For example, after breaking Mr. Simpson's will in regard 
to M.G.'s physical injuries, Officer Marley took time to focus on the injuries on M.G.'s 
anus. (See Exhibit 1b, p.63, Ls.12-14.) She reinforced some of the themes again, and 
before long, Mr. Simpson began making more incriminating statements. (Exhibit 1 b, 
p.66, Ls.23-25.) However, when Officer Marley pushed further, suggesting that 
Mr. Simpson had used his penis to penetrate M.G.'s anus, she hit a truth she could not 
break - Mr. Simpson had not engaged in that conduct. 16 (See also Tr., Vol.1, p.63, 
Ls.9-21 (Officer Marley admitting that Mr. Simpson never adopted her suggestion that 
he had put his penis in M.G.'s mouth either).) Thus, he maintained his innocence on 
16 As Officer Lawrence testified, the goal of interrogating people is to "get information" 
from the subject regardless of whether that information is incriminating to the subject. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.17-p.22, L.25.) 
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that point despite having given coerced-compliant statements in regard to the other 
allegations. 
In that regard, it is important to remember that the veracity of the coerced-
compliant statement is irrelevant to the question of whether there has been a 
constitutional violation - a person's constitutional rights are violated if the officers 
overbear the defendant's will, such that his decision to make a statement that was not 
voluntary. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27. As Dr. Honts explained, both 
the factually-innocent and the factually-guilty person can be coerced to give involuntary 
statements; the only difference is whether the coerced-compliant statement is, itself, 
factually true. (Tr., Vol.1, p.140, Ls.5-15.) Thus, the fact that Mr. Simpson maintained 
his innocence as to using his penis on M.G. does not demonstrate that the officers had 
not already unconstitutionally extracted coerced-compliant statements from him. As 
discussed supra, that's precisely what they did. 
Furthermore, the context of Mr. Simpson's statements about the penetration of 
M G 's anus also indicate that he was still making a coerced-complaint statements. As 
Dr. Lindsey explained (Tr., Vol.1, p.89, Ls 11-24), Mr. Simpson was grasping at straws, 
and so, gave a "simplistic and almost illogical" explanation for the evidence with which 
Officer Marley was confronting him. Compare Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015 
(explaining that both the factually-innocent and factually-guilty face difficulty in offering 
alternative explanations for forensic evidence the officers may or may not actually 
have). And, as Dr. Honts pointed out, Mr. Simpson did not suggest that he had used 
the vibrator to penetrate M.G.'s anus until Officer Marley had suggested it. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.112, L.23 - p.113, L.4.) The record bears out Dr. Honts' testimony: 
JESSICA MARLEY: You didn't put your penis inside? 
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LEROY SIMPSON. (Inaudible) 
JESSICA MARLEY: Did you start 
said. 
Kind of an indication that the doctor 
LEROY SIMPSON: It could have been -- Tracy has a vibrator.[17] I know 
that so --
JESSICA MARLEY: Did you use the vibrator? It's okay, Le[r]oy, if you 
did. 
LEROY SIMPSON: No, I didn't. 
JESSICA MARLEY: Hold on. 
LEROY SIMPSON: Like I said, Tracy's got a vibrator, so I -- I got two, but 
I (inaudible) --
JESSICA MARLEY: The indication is that he had some damage, and 
where there's damage anally, it's bigger than a finger. So you know it 
could have been your penis. It could have been a vibrator. 
LEROY SIMPSON: I know I didn't put my penis in him. 
JESSICA SIMPSON: So was it your vibrator or Tracy's you used? 
LEROY SIMPSON· (Inaudible). 
JESSICA SIMPSON: Okay. Which vibrator? What does that look like. 
LEROY SIMPSON. Tracy (inaudible) it's at her house. 
LEROY SIMPSON: I used Tracy's [vibrator] and put it in [M.G.] one night. 
(Exhibit 1b, p.67, L.14 p.68, L.14 (emphasis added); Exhibit 1b, p.71, Ls.18-19.) 
When Mr. Simpson was unable to give as detailed an account as Officer Marley 
apparently would have liked in regard to the vibrator, she made another statement 
17 It is important to remember that Mr. Simpson is not suspected of causing all of M.G.'s 
injuries. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.37, Ls.3-7 (the prosecutor admitting that Mr. Simpson 
was probably not the source of all M.G.'s injuries).) Consistent with that fact, 
Mr. Simpson tried, at various points in the interrogation, tried to talk about what M.G.'s 
parents had done to M.G., but the officers would either cut off or redirect the 
interrogation when Mr. Simpson did this. (See, e.g., Exhibit 1 b, p.33, Ls.4-21; Exhibit 
1 b, p.34, Ls.4-16.) 
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which, like Officer Lawrence's ultimatum, particularly highlights the coercion that was 
applied during the interrogation of Mr. Simpson: Officer Marley told Mr. Simpson: 
"I trying to figure out and make sure there are no other children. . . Because if 
that's the case, you need a different kind of help." (Exhibit 1 b, p.71, Ls.2-6; see 
generally Exhibit 1 b, p.71, Ls.2-16 (continuing to develop this theme).) There is no 
"right" answer to Officer Marley's question. The subject cannot say that there are no 
kids because that will not answer the question (whether there are other children). The 
call of the question requires the subject to admit harming at least one child. Thus, the 
only real choice the subject has is, like Mr, Simpson ultimately did (Exhibit 1 b, p.71, 
Ls.17-20), to say there are no other children. Otherwise, he would be admitting to 
abusing a number of other children unrelated to this investigation. 18 The no-win 
scenario presented by Officer Marley's question demonstrates that ML Simpson 
immediately-subsequent statement - where he fully, and for the first time, admitted, 
"I used Tracy's [vibrator] and put it in [M.G.] one night" (Exhibit 1, p. 71, Ls.18-19; see 
generally Exhibit 1b, pp.67-71 (emphasis added)) - was also a coerced-compliant 
statement obtained by Officer Marley in violation of his constitutional rights. 
Because all of Mr. Simpson's incriminating statements during this interrogation 
were made after the officers impermissibly overbore his will, and so, were coerced-
18 There was no evidence in the investigation suggesting that there might be other kids. 
(See generally R., Tr.) Thus, unless Officer Marley was being deliberately untruthful 
(which, as Dr. Honts testified (Tr., Vol.1, p.101, Ls.20-23), raises a whole different set of 
issues, see also Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1015), her use of this tactic was to evaluate 
Mr. Simpson's credibility on unrelated issues. This actually runs afoul of the Reid 
technique's instructions, which emphasize that '"[i]nterrogations should not be used as a 
primary means to evaluate the suspect's truthfulness; in most cases, that can be 
accomplished during a nonaccusatory interview."' In re Elias, 237 Cal.App.4th at 580 
(quoting lnbau & Reid, Criminal Confessions and Interrogation, pp.5-6 (5th ed. 2013)). 
Either way, Officer Marley's use of this tactic was improper and resulted in a coerced-
compliant statement. Compare Kysar, 114 Idaho at 458-59. 
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compliant statements, they should have been suppressed. See, e.g., Kysar, 114 Idaho 
459. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Simpson respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, 
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of October, 2015. 
&·d~ 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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